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Abstract

This paper is a cross-sectional analysis of the demand for prescription painkillers. Demand was
broken down into illegal adult use of painkillers, illegal adolescent use, and legal prescriptions
per capita for each state. Data for 2012 were taken from the National Survey on Drug Use and
Health (NSDUH) and the National Prescription Audit as well as from other sources such as the
Census Bureau. Prescription drug monitoring programs were found to decrease illegal use, while
medical marijuana laws and poverty rates increased legal use and use among teens. Both white
population and number of officers decreased illegal use among adults, but increased legal
demand. Regions with more very religious people saw increased legal demand, while regions
with higher education rates saw decreased demand. Single mothers reduced illegal use among
teens. Future studies should look at demand over a longer period of time and try to find measures
of illegal use with more variation.
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In the 2013 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, the DEA listed controlled
prescription drugs as the fastest growing drug abuse threat in the United States. The most widely
abused category of prescription drugs is prescription painkillers, which account for 73 percent of
the nonmedical users of prescription drugs (DEA, 2013). The CDC has declared prescription
drug abuse as an epidemic (ONDCP). Emergency room visits resulting from prescription drug
misuse or abuse increased 114 percent from 2004 to 2011 (DHHS, 2013). The cost for the
medical treatment resulting from prescription drug abuse has been estimated at over $72 billion
per year (DHHS, 2013). The most startling consequence of this epidemic has been the number
of overdoses. According to the NIH, more people die each year from prescription opioid
(painkiller) abuse than all other drugs combined.
When taken improperly, these medications can have effects similar to heroin. Many
users end up turning to heroin, because it is cheaper and easier to obtain. Recent studies have
found that among young intravenous heroin users, almost half began by abusing prescription
drugs (NIDA, 2014). This should be especially concerning considering that prescription drugs
are second only to marijuana as the most commonly abused drugs among young people
(ONDCP). The rise in intravenous heroin and prescription drug abuse also raises the risk of HIV
among users through the sharing of needles (NIDA, 2014).
What's fueling this epidemic of abuse? Part of the problem is that there has been a
dramatic rise in prescriptions issued. The number of prescriptions issued increased by 400
percent from 1999 to 2010 (CDC, 2015). Some of these prescriptions are coming from facilities
known as "pill mills." These are clinics that sell a large amount of medication without giving
comprehensive exams, usually on a cash-only basis (DHHS, 2013). Another popular source of
prescription opioids for addicts is emergency rooms. Thirteen percent of those receiving
4

treatment report that they received their painkillers from emergency rooms. Addicts choose
emergency rooms because it is harder for doctors to get a complete history on patients, which
makes it harder for them to identify those with addictions (DHHS, 2013). Of course, these drugs
are also available through dealers and over the internet, but only 5 percent of those abusing
painkillers get them from these sources (ONDCP). The biggest source of prescription drugs is
actually friends and relatives. Seventy percent of people who abuse prescription drugs reported
getting them from friends and relatives (ONDCP).
This paper will use cross-sectional analysis to determine what is driving this demand for
prescription drugs, both legally and illegally obtained. A special focus will be placed on the role
of prescription drug monitoring programs and medical marijuana laws, which are discussed in
more detail below. Since the literature on this topic is very sparse, this paper will instead try to
draw from the general literature on drug abuse. The sparse literature also lends itself to a more
experimental approach to modeling, as one will see in the model section.
1.1 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs)

In order to combat this growing threat, states have begun setting up programs to collect,
monitor, and analyze data on the distribution of prescription drugs. There are currently 49 states
with active PDMPs and the District of Colombia has recently passed legislation to set up their
own. The only state without a PDMP is Missouri (Brandeis, 2012). The first state to set up a
prescription drug monitoring program was New York in 1918 (Brandeis, 2012). While there
were more states that started up programs going back to the 1930s, about 70 percent of PD MPs
were established between 2000 and 2010 (Brandeis, 2012).
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These programs have been very successful in reducing the misuse of prescription drugs.
Florida, home to 90 of the top 100 oxycodone purchasers, enacted legislation in 2010 and in
2012 saw a 50 percent decrease in oxycodone overdose deaths (DHHS, 2013; CDC, 2015). One
year after modifying their programs to require physicians to check state databases before handing
out prescriptions, both New York and Tennessee saw drops in the number of patients seeing
multiple doctors by 75 percent and 36 percent respectively (CDC, 2015). Oregon was able to
decrease the amount of poisoning deaths due to opioid abuse by 38 percent between 2006 and
2013 thanks to their program (CDC, 2015),
While almost all states have PD MPs, they vary in how they collect data, who can access
the data, and how the data is used. This paper will focus on states with mandatory PDMP laws
to see how effective they are versus non-mandatory laws. This is similar to how Pacula (2013)
broke down medical marijuana laws into states with registries and dispensaries in her study.
1.2 Medical Marijuana Laws (MMLs)

Today, 23 states and the District of Colombia have medical marijuana laws (NCSL,
2015). These laws vary in the conditions that can be treated with marijuana and the amount an
individual is allowed to possess (HOPES, 2012). Some states, such as New Mexico, only allow
medical marijuana to be used for certain conditions such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, and glaucoma
(HOPES, 2012). Other states, like California, allow medical marijuana use for a long list of
conditions including migraines and chronic pain (HOPES, 2012). The ability for patients to take
marijuana for pain relief (in both sets of states) should have some impact on the amount of legal
opioid prescriptions. This lowered demand for legal prescriptions should result in a reduced
supply of illegal opioids, which would increase the price and lower the illegal demand for
prescription opioids.
6

Another effect of medical marijuana laws is a decrease in the price of marijuana,
especially higher grade strains (Anderson, 2013). This decreased price should tell us about the
relationship between marijuana and prescription drug abuse. If the two are true substitutes, then
prescription drug abuse should go down in states that pass medical marijuana laws. If they are
complements, then one would expect to see higher prescription drug use in states with medical
marijuana laws. Due to data limitations, this paper will not be able to determine which, if either,
of these relationships these two drugs have. It is still important to note that one of these effects
may be taking place.
2. Literature Review

Previous literature on the economics of drug use is quite diverse. On the subject of drug
addictions, there have been a variety of factors considered by different authors. In his rational
addiction model, Becker focused heavily on how the past consumption of addictive goods
influenced their current consumption (Stigler and Becker, 1977; Becker and Murphy, 1988).
When thought of as inputs to produce certain effects (such as euphoria), the present use of drugs
increases the cost of producing the same effects in the future (Stigler and Becker, 1977). This is
a demonstration of tolerance, when addicts must use more of the same drug to get the desired
effect (Becker and Murphy, 1988). The model explains that those with higher discount rates will
be more prone to addiction, which is why some drug users do not become addicts (they have
lower discount rates) (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Becker's model also helps to explain that
stressful events can trigger addiction because they lower an individual's utility while raising the
marginal utility of addictive goods (like drugs) (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Bachman et al.
(1998) looked at whether lifestyle factors or societal factors were more important in teen
marijuana use over the past several decades. They found that lifestyle factors play a major role
7

in an individual's decision. But when it came to usage rates among groups, the more important
factors were perceived risk and societal acceptance. While Bachman et al. focused only on
young people, it will be important to consider both of these sets of factors when studying the
general population. In a 2007 study on criminal penalties and marijuana use, Pacula et al. found
that lower criminal penalties and medical marijuana laws raised prices. This increase in price
was concluded to be from a large increase in demand, due to both lower risk and more social
acceptance of the drug, and little change in supply because of the low risk premium. Of course,
there are differences between the markets for prescription painkillers and marijuana, but these
studies are still important in determining what types of factors may play a role in demand.
Another strand of literature concerns the relationship between two different drugs. One
of the earliest researchers to address this topic was Denice Kandel (197 6). Kandel found that
drug use comes in stages. Most adolescents start with alcohol or tobacco, then begin using
marijuana, and finally moving to harder drugs. This would eventually become known as the
gateway effect. There are some who question whether or not there actually is a "gateway effect."
Morral et al. have suggested that marijuana may not cause the use of harder drugs, but rather
those who use marijuana are already more likely to use hard drugs and are just exposed to
marijuana first. After surveying the literature, Hall and Lynskey (2005) found that while
common factor models like the one posited by Morral et al. explain some of the correlation
between marijuana use and hard drug use among youth, a gateway effect is still present.
Specifically, they find that early use of marijuana and higher frequency of use lead to a higher
probability of hard drug use.
While the gateway drug use debate is an important part of the literature, one will notice
that it focuses only on youth. This is an important point because there is evidence that marijuana
8

affects the brain of an adolescent differently than it does that of an adult. Medical researchers
have found that adolescent rats injected with THC exhibited changes in the brain that made them
more susceptible to opiate addictions (Ellgren et al., 2006). In their analysis on the impact of
medical marijuana laws on marijuana use, drinking and hard drug use, Wen and colleagues broke
the sample down into two different age groups. Their first age group was those who were
between 12 and 20, and the second was those 21 years old and over (Wen et al., 2014). They
found that marijuana use rose for those over 21, but not for the first age group. They also found
that binge drinking increased for those over 21, but medical marijuana laws had no effect on
underage drinking. Neither group experienced a change in hard drug use. The final result of
their study somewhat conflicts the results of Chu (2013 ), who found that proportion of adults
(18+) seeking treatment for heroin addiction actually fell in medical marijuana states. However,
this conflict could be due to the fact that Chu uses the proportion of heroin treatments versus
total treatments; therefore it is possible that some of this decline is caused by an increase in
treatments for other drugs. This paper will also divide up the age groups, but in a different
fashion than in Wen et al. (2014 ). A relationship between medical marijuana laws and
prescription drug use is still hypothesized despite Wen et al.'s findings that marijuana did not
affect the use of harder drugs because of the different nature of prescription drugs.
3. Model
In order to get a fuller picture, this paper will examine three different types of demand for
prescription drugs. The first type of demand will be for illegal prescription drugs among those
18 years of age and older, which will be estimated using the following model:
ILPDUA,= Po+ P1ManPDMP, +

p2MML, + P3Prescripts,+ p4 White,+ Ps Old,+ P6 College,+ P1 Poverty,+

p80fficers, + P9 VeryReligious,+ e,.
9

The dependent variable !LPDUAs is the estimated percentage of the adult (18+) population in
each state that misused prescriptions drugs in 2012. Using estimates as a dependent variable
does pose some problems, but there are limited sources of data for illegal prescription drug use.
Therefore this paper will continue to use these estimates provided by the National Survey of
Drug Use and Health. The first independent variable, ManPDMPs, is a dummy variable that
indicates the presence of a prescription drug monitoring program with mandatory enrollment.
MMLs is a dummy variable that indicates the presence of a medical marijuana law. Prescriptss

measures the number of prescriptions for painkillers issued per 100 people for each state. Whites
is the percentage of population in each state that is white. Having this variable helps to control
for differences in use related to culture or access. Olds is the percentage of the population over
65 years of age in each state. This variable is meant to capture a possible supply factor, since a
vast majority of prescriptions for painkillers are issued for individuals in that age group.
Colleges is the percentage of population in a state with at least a bachelor's degree. Poverty5 is

the percentage of the state's population living under the poverty line. Both of these variables
represent a potential opportunity cost of using illegal drugs, with those receiving bachelor's
degrees having a higher cost and those under the poverty having a lower cost due to potential
total lost income 1• Those under the poverty line might also gain greater utility from using these
drugs because of a need to have an escape from their current circumstances. Officerss is the
number of police officers employed in a state as a percentage of the population. The purpose of
this variable is to capture the legal risk for drug abusers. VeryReligiouss is the percentage of
people in each state that identify themselves as such. This variable is to test if states with more
religious populations are less likely to have problems with prescription painkiller abuse than less
religious states. With most drugs this variable would be assumed to be negative, but since
1

It should be noted that the value of a lost dollar of income is greater for the poorer person.
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prescription drugs come from doctors there is a possibility that their use is more acceptable in
these communities and thus will face less competition from other drugs. In this case, a positive
relationship is plausible.
Next, this paper will examine the illegal prescription painkiller demand for adolescents,
those from ages 12 to 17. In order to estimate this demand the following model will be used:
ILPDUYs=

Bo+ B1 ManPDMPs + B2 MMLs + B3 Prescriptss + B4 Whites+ Bs Olds+ B6 Colleges+ B7 Poverty,+
BsOfficerss+

B9 VeryReligious

5

+Bio SMom, +

l::s-

As one can see, the model is almost identical to the model for illegal prescription opioid abuse
among adults. The biggest difference is the last variable, SMom 5 , which represents the
percentage of households headed by a single mother in each state. The hypothesis is that
adolescents living with single mothers will have higher rates of opioid use due to less
supervision. A more subtle difference is the estimated effect of the bachelor's degree variable.
Instead ofrepresenting an opportunity cost of using illegal prescription painkillers, it is now
hypothesized to have an impact on the environment of the youth. If the teen is growing up in a
state with higher rates of education, the perceived risk of illegal drug use may be higher than in
other states.
The third and final type of demand that will be studied is the demand for legal
prescription painkillers. As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a dramatic rise in the
amount of legal prescriptions over the past several years. While these are legally obtained, at
least a portion of these drugs will likely be misused. The model for the demand for legal
prescriptions will be the following:
Prescripts 5 =Bo+ B1 ManPDMP, +

B2 MML, + B3 White,+ B4 Old,+ Bs College,+ B6Poverty

5

+ B10fficers, +Bs YeryReligious,
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The dependent variable in this model is the same independent variable measuring number of
prescription painkillers issued per 100 people used in the previous models. All of the variables
are expected to have the same effect on legal prescription drug demand that they have on illegal
prescription demand.
Other variables that were tested in these models, but rejected include state unemployment
rates, insurance rates, single father households, and dummy variables for region of the country.
These variables were rejected because they were insignificant. Results for models with these
variables and more explanation for why they were rejected are included in Appendix A.
4. Data
Summary statistics for the variables included in the models and their data sources can be
seen below in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Data Sourcesa
Variable Name

Variable

Mean

I LP DUA

Illegal
Prescription
Drug Abuse for
Adults
Illegal
Prescription
Drug Abuse for
Adolescents
Prescriptions
for Painkillers
per 100 people
Dummy for
presence of
medical
marijuana law
Dummy for
presence of
mandatory

I LP DUY

Prescripts

MML

ManPDMP

Minimum

Maximum

4.337761

Standard
Deviation
0.6218594

3.401962

5.595697

5.087339

0.8630669

3.525025

7.151932

87.39216

22.43308

52

143

0.3921569

.4930895

0

1

0.3137255

0.4686233

0

1

12

White
Old

College

Poverty

Officers

VeryReligious

SM om

a.

pd mp
% population
white
% population
over 65 years
old
Proportion of
state with at
least a
Bachelor's
degree
%of
population
living under
poverty line
Number of
officers per
100 people
% of state
population that
identify as very
religious
Proportion of
households
headed by
single mothers

70.0833

16.12817

22.84817

94.14479

13.97704

1.708854

8.544273

18.16851

26.50953

5.634821

17.31328

48.41218

15.21569

3.273309

10

24.2

0.2163405

0.0798358

0.1206395

0.6824044

39.76471

9.036788

23

59

12.40109

2.283076

8.064782

19.22118

ILPDUA and ILPDUY taken from 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health
(NSDUH). Prescripts comes from IMS National Prescription Audit via a CDC Vital
Signs report. MML data comes from the National Conference of State Legislators
(NCSL). ManPDMP comes from Brandeis University's Training and Technical
Assistance Center (TTAC). White, Old, College, Poverty, and SMom come from the
Census Bureau. Officers was taken from the FBI' s Police Employee Data. Very
Religious comes from a 2011 Gallup Poll.

In this model, Medical Marijuana Laws are present in 20 states and mandatory PDMPs are
present in 16 states. Southern states are generally the most religious states and also have some of
the highest prescription rates for prescription pain killers, although not all of the states with high
prescription rates are very religious. Both ILPDUA and !LPDUY have low standard deviations
meaning that our results from these models will be limited because we are measuring small
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differences between states. Both of these models will be kept in the paper for general interest
and to learn what variables may be important if better data becomes available in the future.
5. Results

Table 2 displays the results of each of the models and their significance. An additional
table is available in Appendix C that shows the economic significance of the variables for the
Prescripts model. Surprisingly, MML was not very economically significant even though it was

statistically significant. Officers was more significant, but Old was almost as economically
significant even though it was not statistically significant.
Table 2. Final Results
Variables
ManPDMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
Constant
Adjusted R2

a.

ILPDUA
-0.3597441 **
0.3033757
0.0172406**
-0.0138188**
-0.0722657
0.0161832
0.0545355
-2.836871 **
-0.0161768
N/A
4.801676**
0.4623

* denotes significant at 0.1

level.

ILPDUV
-0.46673*
0.761195**
0.0142172*
-0.0183286
-0.0097175
0.0196863
0.1467168 **
-0.6177977
0.0174525
-0.1664375**
3.862535*
0.3914

Prescripts (robust se)
0.973143
13.08175**
N/A
0.637359**
0.9416391
-1.081213*
2.558175**
81.06522**
1.297201 **
N/A
-55.25522
0. 6822 (non-adjusted)

** denotes significant at 0.05 level.

As one can see mandatory prescription drug monitoring programs and number of legal
prescriptions both appear to affect illegal drug use for both adolescents and adults. States with
PD MPs have lower misuse rates of 0.36 percentage points for adults and 0.46 percentage points
for teens. Legal prescription drugs raise the rates of misuse by 0.017 percentage points among
the adult population and 0.014 percentage points among youth. States with more predominately
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white populations have lower rates of drug abuse for adults. A one percentage point increase in
the white population decreases illegal drug use for adults by 0.014 percentage points.
There are some variables that affect one population, but do not affect the other. Medical
marijuana laws raise youth abuse by 0.76 percentage points, but do not affect adult use. The
youth population is also affected by poverty rates and the proportion of households headed by
single mothers. Higher poverty rates increase prescription drug abuse, while a greater proportion
of single mothers decrease use. A 1 percentage point increase in poverty rates increases abuse
by 0 .146 percentage points and a 1 percentage point increase in rates of single mothers decreases
abuse by 0.166 percentage points. The ratio of police to civilians has an effect on the adult
population, but not on the youth population. A 1 percentage point increase in the officer
population leads to a 2.84 percentage point decrease in prescription drug abuse among adults.
Legal drug prescriptions are influenced by medical marijuana laws, poverty rates,
education, race, religion, and the ratio of police to civilians. States with medical marijuana laws
had 13 .08 more prescriptions per 100 people. Poverty increased legal prescription use, with a 1
percentage point increase in the poverty rate leading to an increase in legal drug prescriptions by
2.56 prescriptions. States with higher education rates saw the amount of legal prescriptions drop
by 1.08 prescriptions per 100 people. While having a more predominantly white population led
to lower illegal painkiller use among adults, it also led to higher legal prescription drug use with
a 1 percentage point increase leading to an increase of 0.64 prescriptions. More religious states
also saw higher legal prescription drug use with a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion
of population that identifies as very religious leading to an increase of 1.30 prescriptions. The
number of police officers had a very strong positive relationship with the number of legal
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prescriptions issued in the state. A 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of police
officers to the general public increased the number of prescriptions by 81.07 prescriptions.
6. Robustness
All three models were tested for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan/CookWeisberg test. The test showed that heteroscedasticity was present for the model for legal
demand (Prescripts), but not for the other two models. In order to correct for the
heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were used. The positive test for legal demand can be
seen below in Figure 1.

Multicollinearity was also tested using correlation matrices and the

variance inflation factor (vif). The vif was below 5 for every variable and none of the correlation
matrices had a value over 0.7, so multicollinearity was determined not to be a problem.
An alternate model using a dummy variable for states in the southern region of the
country (as defined by the Census Bureau) was also performed. The results can been seen in
Appendix B. This model had minimal effects on !LPDUA and !LPDUY models, but prescription
drugs issued had a marked increase in explanatory power as well as some changes in the
significance of other variables. While it is clear from the data that the region with the most
prescription drugs is the south, what is not clear is why. Nothing about its geographic location
would seem to have an effect, so there is something else that must be driving the higher demand.
Since a causal relationship cannot be established between the south and prescription drug
demand, it was decided that this model would not be used.
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Figure 1: Heteroskedasticity Test for Prescripts model

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=
=

3.46
0.0631

7. Discussion
From the results above (in Table 2), one can see that PDMPs seem to be serving their
intended purpose. Illegal use of prescription drugs is lower in states with PD MPs, but the legal
demand is unaffected. It is somewhat surprising that legal demand did not go down since these
laws are aimed at pill mills and other legal sources of painkillers for addicts. This might be due
to the timing of the passage of these laws. If they were passed around 2012, their effects may
not be felt yet.
States with legalized medical marijuana saw higher illegal use of prescription painkillers
among teens and higher legal demand for painkillers. The higher demand by teens may be due to
a lower risk perception because it is now classified as something that can be medicinal. Adults
are more likely to have already formed an opinion on the risk that marijuana poses, which may
explain why medical marijuana laws do not have the same effect on that population. The higher
legal demand is unexpected. It is likely that the restrictions on medical marijuana in many of
these states prevents a substitution effect, but the positive effect is difficult to explain. There
could be a higher acceptance of drug use in these states and those who abuse painkillers are
known to get them from legal sources.
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This also explains why the variable for legal prescriptions led to more illegal use of
prescription drugs. Even if these legal prescriptions do not go directly to abusers, there is still a
higher supply of drugs in these states. It was predicted that the variable for the percentage of
population over age 65 would have a similar effect since they are the biggest legal users of
prescription drugs, but there was no effect from the older population.
The proportion of population that are white had different effects on legal and illegal
prescription drug demand. Legal prescriptions were higher in states with more white
populations. This could be due to differences in the access to prescription drugs or healthcare in
general. A report by the Department of Health and Human Services found that minorities are
subject to poorer healthcare in several areas in the United States (AHRQ, 2012). The lower
illegal demand among adults is more difficult to explain, but may be linked to the quality of care
mentioned above. Higher quality of care may mean that doctors are better equipped to identify
those who may have developed a dependency on these drugs. Other possible explanations are
that there are unidentified economic differences, or it may just be cultural differences.
Neither education nor poverty rates have an effect on the illegal demand of prescription
drugs among adults, but they do affect legal demand. An increase in the percentage of the
population with a bachelor's lowers the legal demand while an increase in the poverty rate raises
it. This could be due to the opportunity cost that was discussed earlier. It could also have to do
with the information available to those with a higher education about the risk of these drugs, and
a lack of information for those under the poverty line. Quality of healthcare is a third possibility,
as those who are in poverty are likely to receive lower quality care (AHRQ, 2012), which may
lead to more prescriptions being handed out without alternatives being considered. A final
possibility is that, due to the nature of their likely occupations, those who are below the poverty
18

line may have more need for pain medications because of accidents or greater stress being put on
their bodies.
Poverty rates and the proportion of single mother households also had an effect on illegal
drug use among teens. Poverty was positively related to illegal teen use, which is most likely
attributable to a lower opportunity cost. The percentage of single mother households had a
negative effect on teen prescription drug use. Since poverty is already controlled for, it is likely
that these are working mothers. These working mothers may not have time to go to obtain or use
prescription painkillers, meaning their children have less access to these drugs.
The number of officers in each state had different effects for legal and illegal demand.
Illegal demand for prescription painkillers among adults is negatively affected by the number of
officers. This is most likely due to the fact that the legal risk is higher when there are more
police and the supply of these drugs is more likely to be disrupted. The demand among youths,
however, is unaffected by the number of police. This may be due to a lower perceived risk
among youths or the belief that taking these drugs is not illegal since they have been prescribed
by a doctor. Interestingly, legal demand was positively related to the number of officers. There
is anecdotal evidence that illegal prescription drug use is linked to higher crime (Goodnough,
201 O; Becker, 2011; Sanbum, 2015). It is likely that the states with higher legal demand also
have higher illegal demand and have had this higher demand previous to 2012; therefore it may
have been necessary for these states to hire more law enforcement. However, this connection
would be better studied in another paper due to the potential endogeneity.
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8. Conclusion
The demand for prescription drugs has been growing at an alarming rate and more work
needs to be done to understand this demand. This paper has examined some interesting
relationships between prescription drug abuse and different factors including medical marijuana
laws, prescription drug monitoring programs, legal prescriptions, and poverty rates. However,
these relationships require further evaluations because of the low standard deviations of the
dependent variables.
Legal prescription painkiller demand was also examined in this paper and it did not suffer
from low variability. The demand for legal prescriptions does offer some insight into illegal
demand, because many drug abusers obtain their drugs from legal sources. The legal demand
was not affected by prescription drug monitoring programs, but was affected by medical
marijuana laws. Demand was also affected by race, poverty, education, religion, and the amount
of law enforcement.
To get an even better understanding of what affects prescription drug abuse, future
studies should examine the demand over time. Unfortunately, the data on the number of legal
prescription painkillers per state is only available for 2012. Not having this data also hurts the
ability to model illegal use of prescriptions over time. Different measures for illegal use may
also prove useful. Other variables may also become more useful over time, such as the
legalization of recreational marijuana.
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Appendix A: Rejected Variables

Table 3: Results with Unemployment included
Variables

ILPDUA

P-value

ILPDUY

P-value

Prescripts

P-value

ManPDMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
Unemployment
Constant
Adjusted R2

-0. 3607777**
0.2969129
0. 0168254 * *
-0. 0130916*
-0. 0701304
0.0156426
0.0496189
-2.810459 **
-0.0146351
N/A
0.0195533
4.638357 **
0.4623

0.028
0.195
0.003
0.054
0.139
0.465
0.170
0.034
0.347

-0.4781753 **
o. 7974287**
0.0144051*
-0. 0177678
-0. 0166896
0.01936
0. 1574605 **
-0. 6703927
0.0130252
-0. 1389537
-0.0599101
4.025933 *
0.3853

0.050
0.023
0.087
0.158
0.809
0.544
0.005
0.723
0.568
0.119
0.442
0.075

0.8425853
12.00157*
N/A
0. 6793656 **
1.100042
-1.089534*
2.015234 *
80.40697**
1.38829 **
N/A
1.775659
-68.00287*
0.6270

0.859
0.070

0.686
0.002
0.4511

0.000
0.427
0.080
0.053
0.031
0.001
0.212
0.097

Unemployment (taken from Bureau of Labor and Statistics) was tested with the theory that those
without jobs have more time to use drugs and less disincentive to use them because they do not
have to worry about job loss. As one can see from the above table, unemployment was not
significant. This does make sense even though one may be unemployed, they are still seeking
work and failing a drug test would be a significant hurdle in getting a job. (In this case, the
Prescripts model was found not to be heteroskedastic, as shown by the figure below).

Figure 2: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with Unemployment included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=

=

2.08
0.1488
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Table 4: Results with Uninsured included
Variables

ILPDUA

P-value

ILPDUY

P-value

Prescripts
(robust se)

P-value

ManPDMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
Uninsured
Constant
Adjusted R2

-0.3588687**
0.3054206
0.0173619**
-0.0135022 * *
-0.0678675
0.0185894
0.0506958
-2.791444**
-0.0157429
N/A
0.0047047
4.585219**
0.4497

0.029
0.183
0.002
0.043
0.177
0.429
0.176
0.037
0.301

-0.4668821 *
0.7718847**
0.0144013*
-0.0166203
0.0054606
0.0276085
0.1324405**
-0.4538755
0.0190239
-0.1604344*
0.016336
3.037325
0.3814

0.056
0.027
0.088
0.198
0.941
0.428
0.024
0.813
0.395
0.053
0.558
0.250

0.9026982
12.82426**
N/A
0.6094301 **
0.6216404
-1.242558 *
2.808475**
77.14681 **
1.255278**
N/A
-0.3336338
-39.43005
0.6849 (nonadjusted)

0.854
0.034

0.802
0.006

0.000
0.622
0.066
0.001
0.021
0.008
0.469
0.411

The rates of uninsured people in each state (obtained through the Census Bureau) was tested to
see ifthe lower prices of prescription drugs and doctors' visits that come with insurance
increased usage or not. It was found to not have an effect. This could be because of the higher
insurance rates after the Affordable Care Act. The effect of this law on prescription drug usage
could be a very good topic for a future paper, but since this variable is insignificant it will be left
out of this paper. Below in Figure 3, one can see the positive test for heteroscedasticity for this
model.
Figure 3: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with Uninsured included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=

2.84

=

0.0921
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Table 5: Results (for ILPDUY) with SDad included
Variables
Man POMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SD ad
Constant
Adjusted R2

ILPDUV
-0. 5139595 **
0. 8922962 **
0.0071663
-0. 0098539
-0. 035234
-0. 013851
0. 1211335 **
-0. 8691623
0.0116326
-0.3587824
5.371138
0.3433

P-value
0.041
0.013
0.366
0.431
0.633
0.716
0.022
0.663
0.626
0.287
0.172

SDad was tested with the same theory of SMom, that children from single parent homes have less
supervision and are more likely to use drugs. SDad and SMom are strongly correlated, so only
one of these variables could be used in the model. As one can see SDad was not significant, so
SMom was used instead.
Table 6: Results with North, West, and Central included
Variables
Man POMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
North
West
Central
Constant
Adjusted R2

ILPDUA
-0. 3453801 *
0. 1715878
0.0200084**
-0. 0165777**
-0. 0481967
0.020719
0.0338861
-2.663993 **
-0. 0169574
N/A
-0.0202129
0.2922601
0.006553
4.590491 **
0.4497

ILPDUY
-0. 5160549*
0.6029428*
0.0104378
-0. 0034482
0.0534455
0.031312
0.1011762
-0. 4487119
0.0121773
-0. 0418402
-0.6683271
0.2863919
-0. 3390909
1.493396
0.4080

Prescripts (robust se)
-4.345907
15.59375 **
N/A
0.8523499**
-0. 3913381
-0.768733
3.067884**
43.52883
1.037677**
N/A
-12.10605**
-20.27261 * *
-18.27354
-48.73748
0.7783 (non-adjusted)

Dummy variables for different regions of the country were also tested. Above is the model that
tested North, West, and Central in relation to the South. The test produces some results for the
Prescripts model, but these variables are left out due to a lack of economic theory. More
regional results can be seen in the next appendix. The positive test for heteroscedasticity can be
seen in the figure below.
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Figure 4: Heteroskedasticity test with North, West, and Central included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=
=

5.06
0.0245
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Appendix B: Alternate Model with South Variable
Different combinations of regional dummy variables were added to the three original models
because of the observation that most of the states with the highest rates of legal prescriptions
were in the south. The South variable was consistently significant in the Prescripts model, but
because there was no economic theory to explain why, none of these regional variables were
included. The results for these alternative models can be seen below. The heteroscedasticity
tests for the Prescripts models is also included (none of the other tests ever had a positive result).
Table 7: Results with South included
Variables

ILPDUA

ILPDUY

ManPDMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
South
Constant
Adjusted R2

-0.3570404 **
0.299564
0.0174449 **
-0.0140342 *
-0.0720262
0.0163115
0.054219
-2.823442 **
-0.0160751
N/A
-0.0154482
4.795837 **
0.46165

-0.5008216 **
0.8100008 **
0.0116384
-0.0159024
-0.0128918
0.0182986
0.1517821 **
-0.8051157
0.01602
-0.1713371 **
.2096734
4.00186 *
0.3820

Prescripts (robust se)
-2.646314
14.50314**
N/A
0. 7436254**
0.4031175
-0. 9657992*
2.301233**
43.67148
. 8400425**
N/A
19.26433**
-33.90059
0. 7631 (non-adjusted)

Figure 5: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with South included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi 2(1)
Prob > chi2

=

=

3.24
0.0717
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Table 8: Results with North, West, and South included
Variables

ILPDUA

ILPDUY

Prescripts (robust se)

Man POMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
North
West
South
Constant
Adjusted R2

-0. 361778 **
0. 1821372
0.0192594 **
-0. 015821 **
-0. 0482411
0.0199383
0.0342127
-2.702581 **
-0. 0169318
N/A
-0.0034613
0.3070262
0.0614397
4.602519**
0.4506

-0. 4699904 *
0.6030981
0.0122614
-0. 007982
0.0407067
0.0269658
0.0945936
-0. 476467
0.0095347
-0. 0534048
-0.3820208
0.5101605
0.2082239
2.037204
0.3990

-3.462777
16.67339 **
N/A
0. 7425648 **
-0. 216779
-1.102196 **
2.595198**
39.66824
0.8870978 **
N/A
4.262954
-5.552083
17.79226**
-26.6831
0.7752 (non-adjusted)

Figure 6: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with North, West, and South included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=
=

4.31
0.0379

Table 9: Results with North, Central, and South included
Variables

ILPDUA

ILPDUY

Prescripts (robust se)

Man POMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
North
Central
South
Constant
Adjusted R2

-0. 3629687*
0.2122771
0. 0183469 * *
-0. 0133993*
-0. 048086
0.0238124
0.0482356
-2.713705**
-0. 0155068
N/A
-0. 2580257
-0.2322728
-0. 1835557
4.376063 **
0.4367

-0.520799 **
0.5657897
0.0104059
0.0003865
0.0704414
0.0387641
0.1048218*
-0. 2820168
0.0149259
-0. 0184699
-1.070223*
-0.7137509*
0.4294051
0.6817264
0.4133

-3.836716
15.93024**
N/A
0.7188042**
-0. 0712077
-1.165238 **
2.350822 **
41.66161
0.9027998**
N/A
8.034006
2.358119
21.50416**
-25.965
0. 7708 (non-adjusted)
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Figure 7: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with North, Central, and South included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=

=

3.77

0.0522

Table 10: Results with West, Central, and South included
Variables

Man POMP
MML
Prescripts
White
Old
College
Poverty
Officers
VeryReligious
SM om
West
Central
South
Constant
Adjusted R2

ILPDUA
-0. 3424142*
0. 1809221
0.0195157**
-0. 016297**
-0. 0496895
0.0202097
0.0328182
-2.728475**
-0. 0185014
N/A
0.3427405
0.0696306
0. 1050674
4.670923**
0.4517

ILP DUY
-0.5160315*
0.6337203*
0.0126732
-0. 0124215
0.0273371
0.019921
0. 1004658
-0. 5167082
0.013152
-0. 0935403
-0.6116386
0.1056438
0.3835207
2.78905
0.3881

Prescripts (robust se)
-4.30806
16.29506**
N/A
0. 7803311 **
-0. 0162032
-1.01563 **
2.727536 **
40.6747
0. 9602353 **
N/A
-10.20687**
-6.746073
12.1354 **
-33.92507
0. 7787 (non-adjusted)

Figure 8: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with West, Central, and South included

Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: constant variance
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople
chi2(1)
Prob > chi2

=
=

5.08
0.0242
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Appendix C: Economic Significance of Prescripts
Table 11: Economics Significance Calculation of Prescripts Model
variable name

coeff.

mean

ManPDMP

0.973143

0.313726

0.3053

0.00152671

MML

13.08175

0.392157

5.130099

0.025654045

White

0.637359

70.0833

44.66822

0.223372041

Old

0.941639

13.97704

13.16133

0.06581575

College

1.081213

26.50953

28.66245

0.14333209

Poverty

2.558175

15.21569

38.9244

0.194648942

Officers

81.06522

0.216341

17.53769

0.087700595

Very Religious

1.297201

39.76471

51.58282

0.257949827

199.9723

1

coeff*mean

Total

% of total accounted for

As one can see, the most economically significant variable in this model is VeryReligious. While
it is a little surprising that it accounts for this much change in the model, it does make sense

when one looks at the data and sees that many of the most religious states are in the south. This
is also the region where one sees some of the highest rates oflegal prescription pain killer
demand. The next three most economically significant variables are White, Poverty, and
College. All of these variables are almost twice as significant as the next most significant
variable, Officers. The high significance of these variables does make sense when one considers
the theory behind them. The opportunity costs for those with college degrees and above the
poverty line does seem to be a strong factor. The quality in healthcare, which is reflected in all
three variables could also be playing a major role.

32

